Preface
When discussing Jesuits and Communism it is impossible not to mention Edmund Aloysius Walsh, S.J. ). Writings about him have been extremely varied, but, undoubtedly, looming over his long and illustrious career like an ominous "specter" is the shadow of his "anti-communism." Some writers, in attempting to minimize Walsh's achievements, have concentrated their attention on this aspect and have analyzed it negatively, justifying their own criticism through innuendo and hearsay, and, most certainly, relying upon incomplete and often flawed research. Walsh's first-hand experiences in Russia mark the beginning of a remarkable international career, and the following article briefly outlines that world and the events with which he dealt.
A second generation American of Irish descent, Walsh was an outstanding Jesuit, a workaholic of exceptional resilience, and a steadfast and trusted papal delegate. Walsh's "missions" are an integral part of the major international events of the twentieth century: director of the Papal Famine Relief Mission to Russia (1922- In the current article, we will describe his role as emissary for the Papal Famine Relief Mission to Russia. This will serve to give a firsthand view of a portion of the "Bolshevik world" and of Communism as applied in Russia, but it also provides an opportunity to trace the manner in which the Bolshevik Revolution was viewed outside of Russia, most particularly by the Vatican. We will journal of jesuit studies 5 (2018) come face to face with the overall expression of an era that permeated daily life. Bolshevik Russia, with its turbulent reality, in continuous transformation, will remain in the background of our account, but it is interesting, however, to quote the succinct but effective analysis of events made by the authors of the book on the American Relief Administration [hereafter ara]:
The revolution of March, 1917 , which overthrew the Czar, was hastened at least, if not actually precipitated, by "bread riots" in Petrograd and Moscow. The inability of the provisional government to handle the food situation, as much as anything else, made possible the coup d'état of October 25, 1917, known as the Bolshevist Revolution. Lenin and his grimly competent associates were abler and more determined than their predecessors. But they, too, failed to solve the food situation, although they did control distribution, and thus used food as a weapon to compel support and to thwart opposition.1
Mention is also made that reverberations from the Russian famine were already felt at the Paris Peace Conference (1919); however, the aid offered to Russia at that time was refused since civil war was under way and formerly allied armies were still operating on Russian soil. This situation had changed, however, with the great drought and famine of 1921, and this is exactly the date from which our account begins.
The Russian Famine: A Humanitarian and Religious Opportunity
On August 21, 1921, following Maxim Gorky's (1868-1936) plea to the world, the Riga Agreement was signed with Maxim Litvinov (1876-1951) for Russia and Walter Lyman Brown (1865-1966) for the ara. This agreement, which concerned only aid for children and the sick, and its particularly stringent conditions, would also provide the basis that the Soviets themselves utilized to reject requests for further concessions: only requests from those whose governments had already signed an agreement directly with the Soviet Republic were considered valid.2 This is what happened with the Holy See in 1923 when it attempted to renew the agreement directly with the Soviet authorities following the conclusion of the ara's operations in Russia. However, we are getting ahead of events. The operations of the ara in Russia began almost immediately. Funds for the organization came from private as well as public sources and included a full spectrum of religious organizations. The funds donated by each religious group were individually administered in Russia by a selected American representative under the supervision of the director of the Russian Relief Program, Colonel William N. Haskell (1878 Haskell ( -1952 . 3 On March 12, 1922, following a delay of approximately six months in the appointment of an American representative to oversee the Catholic contributions, the Vatican signed the agreement to enter Russia under the auspices of the ara. The papal delegation would begin its work in Russia under Walsh's leadership in July 1922 .
But what were the decisions made by the Roman church prior to this, even before Gorky's plea for humanitarian aid? States, in fact, were not the only ones to take a pragmatic view of Russia's internal reality as it developed in the aftermath of World War i and the Bolshevik Revolution. Already in August 1917, the words used by Archbishop (Count) Andrey Szeptycki (1865-1944), Ruthenian Metropolitan of Halych and Lvov (Poland),4 in a letter addressed to the father general of the Jesuits, (Count) Włodzimierz Ledóchowski (1866-1942), were ones of incitement to act now that "the door is open" for the conversion of Russia to Catholicism. It seems impossible-said Szeptycki, rhetorically-not to respond to this invitation from providence, but we must do so not through the Latin rite, rather the Eastern one, so as not to harm the cause of the Union!5
The aforesaid request and its proponent, Szeptycki, would be cited in a Report of December 19, 1921, submitted to Cardinal Giovanni Tacci (1863-1928), secretary of the Congregation for the Oriental Churches, by the apostolic nuncio of Poland, Lorenzo Lauri (1864-1941). His analysis was a lucid and extremely precise examination of the new reality created by the disappearance of the czarist empire and the dismembering of significant parts of the territory previously included within the borders of Imperial Russia: "Certainly the work of journal of jesuit studies 5 (2018) 71-96 the Mission in Russia will succeed more easily if conciliation can be obtained between the Poles and the Ruthenians, yet, up to now we are still far distant from this."6
The prelate warned against the rise and revitalization of nationalisms, which would not benefit the cause of Catholicism, especially at the moment when the Bolsheviks were ferociously attacking the very foundation of religion in Russia. Moreover: "It will also be necessary to separate the work for conversions in the territory subject to the Polish Republic from that in the territory forming part of the Russian State."7
Monsignor Lauri warned against the fact that, behind apparent religious guise, there were political movements that wished to extend their influence in all those regions where they might find related ethnic concentrations. Therefore, the Poles fear the Ukrainian-Ruthenians because in them they see only Little Russia intent on attacking the heart of Latin Catholicism, of which they are the representative in the midst of "Orientals":
For this reason attempting to bring about a return to the Greek rite of the hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of Podlachia and Chelmno who for 16 years have lived under the Latin rite, and who in large part find themselves content with it, is impractical, aggravating and dangerous, more so since the priests who would have to carry out the work would be the Ruthenians of Galicia, who in this moment the Polish unfortunately consider much more as political agitators than as missionaries and shepherds of the soul.8
On the other side are the Ukrainians who view themselves as the "papal appointees" for overcoming the schism, but fear that within their own country they harbor the onset of internal struggles borne by Polish enemies, as well as by the Russian Orthodox and by the Germans settled in the area of the Volga. The point of contention is eastern Galicia, but there is yet still more in the way of the devoutly wished mass conversion.
The documents furnished for use by the "Apostolic Delegates in Russia"9 present a brief treatise on the rite with comments that are extremely clear but equally "divisive," even today. Point C speaks of the recommended manner of dealing with the religious spirit of the Russians, reminding the reader of how particular that is and how the people have perfect knowledge of the intonation of every chant and of every gesture of the officiate: "At Constantinople, in 1921, the Russian Bishops refused to continue officiating with the Greeks because to them the nasal chant of the latter seemed Jewish. [Continuing to point D]: The low mass of the Ruthenians disgusts them more than a sacrilege." Lauri does not limit himself to refuting Szeptycki's analysis, which tends to identify Ukraine as the departure point for overcoming the schism and returning the lost sheep to the fold. Lauri also warns against Polish nationalism, and he remarks on the action of a prelate whose difficulties will be closely linked to Walsh,10 to the Papal Famine Relief Mission in Russia, to the return from Moscow to Rome of the relics of Blessed Andrzej Bobola, and, not least of all, as we shall see, to considerations raised in his regard in the Ponenza of December 17, 1923. The prelate in question is Archbishop Jan Cieplak (1857-1926), about whom Lauri, as apostolic nuncio, writes to Pietro Cardinal Gasparri (1852-1934).11
In summary, all are in agreement on overcoming the schism, in the sense that Russia should return under Roman guidance, but the form, the means, and, above all, nationality divide them.
1.1
The Conditions in Soviet Russia Superior General Włodzimierz Ledóchowski's missive to the cardinal secretary of state serves as our initial guide in deciphering the conditions the thirteen missionaries of the Holy See12 would encounter once they arrived in Russia to 10 Giovanni Battista Cieplak had already come under police surveillance during the czarist era for suspicion of Polish nationalism. , that indicate the religious identity of the Soviet government staff members for diplomatic relations with whom he enters into contact.19 This is to cite two authoritative sources from two quite different provenances, a clear indication of the fact that this was a commonly used language, and, in addition, that it was evidently given credence, considered to be a simple affirmation of irrefutable facts. Walsh himself, in his personal travel diary, prepares a historical analysis of the Czarist period and of the endemic causes of the influences that brought about the nation's collapse, noting statistical data on the population present in Russia and making this distinction:
Slavs (or Russian proper), Cossacks, Poles, Jews, Mongolians comprising Finns, Turks, Tartars, Bashkirs, Kirghizes and Kalmucks. In Religion these people were Greek Catholic (87,000,000), Roman Catholic (11,400,000), Protestant (6,500,000), Jews (5,100,000), Mohammedans (4,000,000) and Pagans (500,000).20
This is a distinction according to race, which precedes the religious and then the political choices. As in the instances mentioned above, when writing in his diary, Walsh also cites the known list of the components of the Bolshevik government (which replaced that of Kerenski in October 1917), indicating the Jewish surnames of several of them in parentheses to reveal their true "nature." In this, he too was a man of his time.
1.2
Objectives of the Mission This was Ledóchowski's description of the Mission's objectives:
i. The aim of the expedition is triple: nb. It appears that the activity of the first Missionaries should be entirely concentrated on charitable works which will be the distribution of aid […] . This charity will be the most effective means, as Jesus himself said, to draw the people to the true Church and prepare the ground for future apostolic activity which, for the moment, would be imprudent.21
Parenthetically, we have a statement dated November 17, 1922, which, perhaps, gives an insight into the Soviet government's view of the Roman church's objectives and hopes in Russia. It would seem to quote (Karl) Radek (1885-1939), member of the Soviet government. Use of the word "seem," however, is mandatory because nothing in the document, which is unsigned, assures us that it is definitely attributable to him. Even the author of the missive is clothed in anonymity:
M. Radek, Israelite and known communist, recently presented himself to a foreign diplomat in Moscow and, among other things, made the following declaration: "I find that the Vatican and the Soviets actually have very similar objectives: the destruction of the schismatic Church in Russia. However the dignity of the Russian State does not permit it to place Catholicism in a situation any better than that of the schismatic church."22
1.3
The Obstacles of Bolshevik Legislation: State and Church, Separated under the Same Roof The basic articles of law that would change the daily organization of all Russia were few but concrete. As was inevitable, they were founded on the altered conception of the relationship between state and citizens, which could no longer be mediated by someone not directly appointed by the directional center of Soviet Authority, i.e. the party and its hierarchy. The specific norm of 1918 stated: The Holy See authorizes Mr. Abbot M. Edmond Walsh to occupy himself with organizing the pontifical relief for Russia. It blesses all of his efforts, which he will carry out to better demonstrate to the Russians the love that the Holy Father holds in their regard, and prays God to recompense those who would aid him.35
By March 19, 1922, the organization of the mission was at a good point and once again, albeit in an indirect manner, the general re-proposes Walsh:36
As concerns our Company, I would like to assure H.E. that even though, as I said yesterday, I believe that Fr. Walsh would be truly well suited for organizing the central office having given proof of great organizational talent both as founder of the first commercial consular school in Washington and also in the time of war, nonetheless we would be equally content if the center were entrusted to others, because our only wish is to serve this great cause well according to the will of the Holy See and to help others.37 Here is a second "confidential" letter from the superior general to Pizzardo, December 14, 1922:
I would first like to insist in all humility that a true head of the Pontifical Delegation in Russia be appointed as soon as possible […] . One must deal with a horrible government that compounds the Byzantine perfidy of the former Russian government, which history has shown was always highly astute at deceiving, "with the Judaic hate towards all that is Christian."41 Certainly they will have already noticed the lack of unity in the Pontifical Mission, I imagine not without satisfaction, and they will profit from it for their ends […] . It is most certainly correct that the Pontifical Delegation should increasingly render itself independent from the American Mission […] but this again requires a strong organization, impossible without a head. And it does not seem possible to me that this can be done from Rome, although it should be clear that the head must be in continuous contact with the Holy See, faithfully execute all its orders. And we arrive at the crux of the question:
A representative,42 such as Father Walsh has been until now, is not enough, and places him in a false position which consumes a part of his energies. It is not possible that all the individual heads deal with the Moscow central government, the representative must do it. But if he then has no authority to enforce acceptance of what has been determined, I think the damage is also to the Holy See, it being seen that the Pontifical Delegation lacks the same unity and discipline found in the others […] .
As concerns the identity of this head, H.E. knows that from the beginning I did not think of one of our Fathers, but proposed a member of another order […] . It is clear that Fr. Walsh cannot be considered, but perhaps he could still serve as procurator for the new head, who must clearly inform him of defects and instruct him, otherwise he will not be able to serve well. Certainly he does not have experience in handling diplomatic affairs, but I think that in addition to a more than ordinary level of energy, he also has an uncommon gift for organization. I also do not think he would be autocratic in character; not being a Superior, something that he understood very well, he believed that, given the circumstances, his duty was to give certain instructions to the others, and this perhaps created ill feelings.43
And not to forget from whence comes true civilization: "Furthermore he is a cooperative man, of very great devotion to the Holy See. As H.E. knows, the Americans have their defects but also great qualities with which, I believe, they can render very great service to the Church, if they are well directed." He then underlines the conditions of great stress under which Walsh himself is operating and suggests that to find another person, as capable and faithful a servant as Walsh, will not be easy. Although the possibility of appointing an apostolic delegate to head the Papal Famine Relief Mission was frequently discussed, no appointment was made. Walsh handled the organizational duties of the mission as well as represented the Vatican in its direct negotiations with the Soviets throughout his tenure with the mission. 42 The underlining is as in the original text. 43
Walsh, alien to the sophisticated curial language, had, on the contrary, understood the Pope's words as a total endorsement: "He confirmed all faculties given and said 'Charity supplies all' , then added 'I communicate to you all faculties and powers which I can communicate' . He did not add for Russia -hence, strictly speaking, they are not geographically limited. According to further information provided by Mgr. Cieplak, the Catholics could only have use of the churches for religious purposes under obligatory conditions imposed by the Soviets-conditions that were settled by a contract in the form of a receipt for the use of the church.
The formula proposed for this receipt by the Moscow central government was unacceptable because it contained the explicit declaration that the building was nationalized and that the civil authority was intervening in the exercise of worship. A suitable formula was reached only after long negotiations between Fr. Walsh and Commissar Krassikov , the officer of the Department of Justice who was responsible for the matter.
Krassikov temporarily accepted the formula so that the churches (which had been closed) could be reopened for the Christmas celebrations, with 44 Organized to decide whether the papal mission to Russia should continue and under which conditions. 45
The trial launched by the Soviet authority against Cieplak, his Vicar Konstatyn Budkiewicz and numerous priests of his diocese, filled the pages of international newspapers thanks to Walsh's astuteness. The reports on the trial stirred reactions of public indignation and stimulated actions by the chancelleries of several nations. Of interest is the article published by Pravda and Izvestia on March 30, 1923, the text of which is described in Edmund Walsh, "Cathfund Moscow Report No. 38," arsi, Russia 2002-i, Report 38, 33.
the reservation that there would be future negotiations with the Holy See for the definitive legal status. A Catholic lay delegation that arrived in Moscow from Petrograd with Mons. Budkiewicz as head considered the formula very opportune. Mons. Cieplak also said that the formula was very favorable given the spirit of freedom that Father Walsh had been able to introduce. Krassikov personally took the formula and delivered it to the Catholic delegation, adding a letter of recommendation for the Petrograd Local Authority, which said:
If the Catholics sign, you can "open the churches."
At this point a mysterious event took place, for which there is as yet no exact explanation: the delegation of Catholics departed for Petrograd but did not sign the formula nor did they deliver Krassikov's letter to the local Authority of Petrograd, even though it was addressed to it.46
This very serious fact (which the Soviets asserted had occurred under direct orders from the Polish Legation in Moscow) was, in the opinion of Father Walsh, the principal cause of his inability to save the life of Budkiewicz who, it should be noted, was charged with delivering Krassikov's letter to the Petrograd Soviets.
The trial against the Petrograd clergy, although in large part prearranged, seems to have been initiated because of this incident. Fr. Walsh was no longer able to delay it. Krassikov often said to Fr. Walsh: you too have been fooled, the Poles did this to cause a world scandal. And he repeated that he had given the letter to Budkiewicz in order to reopen the Petrograd churches as soon as possible, but after such an act, the priests could very well be prosecuted for embezzling an official letter of the central authority and as agents provocateurs.
Father Walsh, seeing that the churches were not being opened, believed that the fault was entirely with the Soviets; but when after a month he learned that the letter had not been delivered, he made clear the tactless nature of the act, involving as it did a letter addressed by Krassikov directly to the Petrograd Authority [the letter, whether signed or not, should have been delivered in any case]. And when, following the insistence of Fr. Walsh, Mgr. Cieplak made up his mind to sign the formula, the Soviets responded that it was too late.
After the trial, Fr. Walsh had to prepare a second formula, in agreement with Krassikov, which naturally was much less favorable […] These few notes will give you some idea of the interesting but at the same time tedious negotiations of the last three months. Soviets cancelled the previous Vatican Agreement but expressed desire for continuance of reconstructive assistance. They declared no formal agreement would be made in the future as we would be obliged to conduct our operations on a mere exchange of informal letters […] . They were absolutely set against a Contract, intimating that the time for all that was past. We insisted and towards the end of October they agreed to make a Contract, as an exception in favor of Vatican.48
However, it was known to all that the period of drought and famine had ended and, above all, that the ara had enjoyed the support of the government of the United States, which had guaranteed a number of organizational advantages no longer available to participating relief missions, as well as the fact that, through the secretary of commerce, its "privileged partner" would purchase essential goods only in America. 49 The second document is the one for which the Soviet Authority had requested a signature on the part of the Catholic faithful led by Cieplak and his vicar, Budkiewicz, in order to reopen the churches of Petrograd for religious service. It is divided in two parts: "Attachment No. i" is the text that Walsh had "adjusted" so as to be acceptable to the responsible Soviet Authority (Piotr Krassikov). "Attachment No. ii" consists of a "standard" formula for authorization of use of religious places. Signature to this document was requested from all the religious denominations that wished to practice their own rite.50
5.1
Walsh's Report on the State of the Church in Russia51 There were four fundamental points to Walsh's report concerning the following issues: professor of international law at the University of Pisa, and to decide on the point under discussion: how to respond to the Soviet authority which, in order to permit the continuation of the Papal Famine Relief Mission on Russian territory, required the establishment of a common basis for bilateral agreement to ensure the protection, respect, and freedom of movement of the Vatican emissaries, on the basis of state laws and international norms on the matter. The urgency of the decision was also related to the fact that Archbishop Cieplak was currently held in a Soviet prison, along with more than a dozen other priests and prelates. The question to be answered is recorded thusly: "Assembly of Most Eminent Cardinals for discussion of possible de facto recognition of the Soviet government by the Holy See with agreement to begin negotiations for definition of the juridical status of the Catholic Church in Russia."54 We use the words of Rosa for greater comprehension:
The question that is now proposed is very grave, even more so for the urgency of the extreme conditions in Russia, and demands our most scrupulous examination: if it is opportune or not that the Holy See, by initiating diplomatic relations with the revolutionary and communist government of the Soviets, give them public recognition of some kind, and what that would be.
There are many other religious questions connected to this which the Russian revolution, no less anti-Christian and bloody than the French one of the 18th century, has raised and will continue to raise, repeating itself as in the times of the French revolution, when the Holy See instituted a Congregation of its own, super negotia regni Galliarum, for their resolution.
The thoughts of all turned to the comparison with the French Revolution. The responses of the cardinals were primarily addressed at refuting Rosa's reflections, rather than indicating a practicable course for the Holy See. Cardinal Ragonesi used strong words against the Soviets, and he also refuted the exemplifications contained in Rosa's Opinion: "It is not appropriate to cite the case of Napoleon, who presented himself as a savior. The current case of the Soviets has no comparable equivalent in history." Cardinal Merry del Val asked for prior acquisition of a written request from the Soviet Government: "so that they, being as astute as they are, cannot say that it is the Holy See that asked to enter into direct negotiations with them." Although expressing doubts that a pontifical representative in Russia could be advantageous for the Church, it would be possible to send a representative (neither a nuncio nor an apostolic delegate) charged with negotiating in exceptional cases and without episcopal character. Cardinal Tacci said that one should not take: the responsibility of losing a good occasion to make some attempt in favor of the poor Russian population. The confidential step taken by the Soviets is already something; previously there was a Pontifical Mission in Russia, which opened the road with its charitable works and has procured great advantages. This could not have been done without contacts, at least personal, with the Soviet authority. In the current case, if certain conditions and declarations were pre-established -i.e. that the Holy See would not recognize the Government or its legitimacy in the true and proper sense, one could proceed by that route. A start could also be made with an Apostolic Delegate, with the mandate of negotiating with the Government. This might be sufficient, because the Russian Government would feel gratified by this contact. For his part, the Apostolic Delegate would gather knowledge of what their real intentions are and could do something. If, then, the Soviets were not content with an Apostolic Delegate, who does not have diplomatic character, it could be decided whether it were appropriate to do something more. The steps of the Holy See can always be easily explained. It does this for the supreme reasons of the good of souls.
Cardinal Locatelli was of the same opinion as Cardinal Tacci.
Finally, Secretary of State Gasparri spoke, illustrating in an impeccable manner the subtle diplomatic differences in the possible forms of recognition between states, de jure and de facto, essentially expressing himself in favor of following the route of an apostolic delegate, and, in any case, of continuing to maintain a mission in Russia and therefore of continuing to negotiate with the Soviets.
There was one curial voice, however, which avoided joining a faction or expressing a vote, pro or con. Cardinal Granito di Belmonte had sent a letter written in his own hand:
Before beginning negotiations with the Russian Government in a definitive manner, it would be a strong signal of great effect for Catholicism in those countries if in the next Consistory, the Holy Father would reserve [the appointment to Cardinal] of Archbishop Cieplak "in pectore," and then make this appointment public after the diplomatic negotiations were concluded. The reserve made now would have neither the significance of a condition nor of an imposition on the Government. With Cieplak freed, the Holy Father, if he called him to Rome, could entrust him with the Russian Seminary and have a good Counselor for the religious questions of those countries. Become the "Roman Cieplak," there would not even be the complications of the Berretta, or other.
The list of aspirants to the cardinal's hat {beret} is so long and difficult to climb that it is not possible to create exceptions. The cardinals rejected the idea of an apostolic delegate as well as any and all openings towards the Soviets.
Reflections
The documents presented here are only the "visible," selected part of those found in the consulted archives and which relate the complex of intentions and reasons that led to the laborious, slippery, and inconclusive negotiations with no agreement on plans for concrete and productive collaboration between the Vatican and the Soviet Government during Walsh's mission, 1922-23. Subsequently, the situation would get even worse. What becomes evident is the conflict between cross purposes in making even the smallest choice, too many reciprocal prejudices impeding positive relations, too many undeclared expectations and hoped-for fruits to be gathered surreptitiously by each from the other. The printed report of the texts submitted to the consistory of cardinals clearly reveals a political action of nationalistic character, grossly cloaked in religious motivations, which at that time was kept secret, as well as an almost inextricable nexus of the said and not said, tightly connected to intentions and to actions that would culminate in the harsh condemnation of Cieplak and Budkiewicz. In fact, an analysis of the documents reveals a more prosaic reality, which is organically integrated with the course of nationalistic rivalries and their attempts for supremacy over territorial areas. This is further aggravated by motives of visceral animosity that far overstep the bounds of reason and of good government and demonstrate not a purely religious intention but rather a chauvinistic one.
Walsh's balanced vision and his ability to negotiate in the midst of this difficult and highly charged situation most certainly belies the doubts that Superior General Ledóchowski had confided in his letter of December 14, 1922, to Pizzardo regarding Walsh's diplomatic capacities. In fact, Walsh won the confidence of the Holy See to the extent that he would, throughout the next ten years, be called upon to represent the Vatican in a number of vital organizations and negotiations.
